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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court frequently must decide how much
to defer to a state legislature. Examining two lines of cases—challenges 
to state laws under the Fourteenth Amendment and challenges to state laws
under the dormant Commerce Clause—reveals that the Court does not have
a coherent approach to deciding how much it ought to defer. In Fourteenth 
Amendment cases, the Court defers substantially to state legislatures. In
dormant Commerce Clause cases, the Court defers little to state legislatures.
The Court has not explained why it applies different levels of deference 
in these two types of cases.
This Article argues that the Supreme Court’s current approach in these 
two lines of cases is not just unexplained or incoherent, but backwards.
Because the Court should aim to ameliorate power differentials, its level 
of deference to state legislatures should depend on the political power of
the plaintiff challenging the law.  Typical dormant Commerce Clause plaintiffs 
have significant power in Congress, whereas Fourteenth Amendment 
plaintiffs typically seek judicial review of legislation because they have
already lost out in the political process at the state level and do not have 
realistic hope of congressional intervention. Instead of correcting imbalances 
of political power, the Court’s practice of engaging in active review in 
cases brought by politically powerful dormant Commerce Clause plaintiffs 
and passive review in cases brought by typically less powerful Fourteenth 
Amendment plaintiffs reinforces existing power differentials. 
Following this introduction, this Article proceeds in three main parts.  
First, Part II details the varying levels of deference to state legislatures that 
the Court applies in Fourteenth Amendment versus dormant Commerce 
Clause cases. Second, Part III explores potential justifications for the 
divergence, ultimately arguing that the Court’s current approach is unjustified.  
Third, Part IV argues that the political power—or lack thereof—of plaintiffs 
should determine the extent to which the Court defers to the legislature. It
further argues that because of the comparative political power of Fourteenth 
Amendment and dormant Commerce Clause plaintiffs, the Court should
222
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be more passive when reviewing laws that may violate the dormant 
Commerce Clause and more active when reviewing laws that may violate 
the Fourteenth Amendment—the opposite of its current approach.
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S DIVERGENT LEVELS OF DEFERENCE IN 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND DORMANT COMMERCE 
CLAUSE CASES 
The Supreme Court takes two divergent approaches to Fourteenth
Amendment and dormant Commerce Clause cases.  The Court takes a passive
approach in Fourteenth Amendment cases, deferring substantially to
legislatures, and an active approach in dormant Commerce clause cases,
deferring little to legislatures.1 
1.  Other commenters have noted the Supreme Court tends to engage in more active
review in some types of cases than in others, but they have focused on the Rehnquist Court
and not earlier examples of this divergence. Furthermore, they have not focused specifically 
on the divergence between the Court’s approach to the dormant Commerce Clause and its
approach to Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection cases. For example, by analyzing 
the congruence and proportionality test that the Rehnquist Court established in City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), K.G. Jan Pillai points to the Court’s differing
approaches to “state commercial discrimination,” “state discrimination against the disabled,”
and the Eighth Amendment to support his argument that the Rehnquist Court’s congruence 
and proportionality “[t]est is so fundamentally elusive and nonviable that it can only serve 
as a convenient vehicle for promoting the subjective views and personal philosophies of 
the five adhering Justices.” K.G. Jan Pillai, Incongruent Disproportionality, 29 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 645, 647–48 (2002).  Similarly, Bradley W. Joondeph points out:
A careful examination of the Rehnquist Court’s record in the full range of 
federalism decisions shows that the five Justices most responsible for the Court’s
“federalism offensive”—Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas— 
were largely indifferent to state policy-making autonomy in cases involving
preemption and the dormant Commerce Clause. If anything, these Justices actually
pushed the law in the opposite direction, increasing the likelihood that state
initiatives would be preempted or invalidated on dormant Commerce Clause 
grounds. 
Bradley W. Joondeph, Federalism, the Rehnquist Court, and the Modern Republican
Party, 87 OR. L. REV. 117, 119 (2008). Other commentators who have written about the
Court’s treatment of legislative fact-finding have argued the Court is deferential to legislatures
in dormant Commerce Clause cases, a thesis this article rejects. See, e.g., Caitlin E.
Borgmann, Rethinking Judicial Deference to Legislative Fact-Finding, 84 IND. L.J. 1, 15
(2009) (“For example, in contrast to the Dormant Commerce Clause context, where the
Supreme Court has often been deferential to state legislative fact-finding, the Court has
recently been notably loath to defer to Congress’s fact-finding in cases challenging 
Congress’s power to act under the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Enforcement Clause.” (footnotes omitted)); David Parker, Note, Policing Procedure
Before Substance: Reforming Judicial Review of the Factual Predicates to Legislation, 99
223





     





     
 
 
      
    
  
     
      
 
     
      
  




     
    
     
    
  
      
   
        
   
      
   
          




     
     
  
  
A.  The Passive Approach in Fourteenth Amendment Cases
In Fourteenth Amendment cases, the Court has frequently emphasized 
the importance of judicial restraint. The Court argued that using “the ‘vague 
contours’ of the Due Process Clause to nullify laws which a majority of 
the Court believed to be economically unwise” would encroach on legislatures’ 
power.2 Justice Felix Frankfurter, in particular, argued in Fourteenth 
Amendment cases that judicial power “must be on guard against encroaching
beyond its proper bounds, and not the less so since the only restraint upon 
it is self-restraint. [I]t is not the business of this Court to pronounce policy.
It must observe a fastidious regard for limitations on its own power.”3 
Scholars have gone further. Alexander Bickel argued that willingness 
to invalidate state laws on Fourteenth Amendment grounds was an “assault 
upon the legal order” that promoted lawlessness.4 Bickel even expressed
the view that repealing the Due Process Clauses “might have been a solution” 
to judicial activism because the Due Process Clauses left too much room for
judicial policymaking.5 Bickel praised Justice Frankfurter6 for his tendency 
VA. L. REV. 1327, 1332 n.28 (2013) (“In dormant commerce clause cases, the Court
generally defers to the legislature, but in commerce clause cases or Fourteenth Amendment
Enforcement Clause cases, the Court has discarded Congress’s factual determinations in 
favor of its own.” (citing Borgmann, supra)). 
2.  Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731 (1963) (footnote omitted) (quoting Adkins
v. Children’s Hosp. of D.C., 261 U.S. 525, 567–68 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
3.  Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 119–20 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
4.  ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 120–21 (1975). 
 5.  ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 22– 
30 (1970). 
6.  Justice Frankfurter’s restrained or passive approach in Fourteenth Amendment 
cases, and Bickel’s praise for it, is worth mentioning because of Frankfurter’s active
approach in dormant Commerce Clause cases. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.  
Bickel even pointed out that Frankfurter treated the Commerce Clause differently from
other constitutional provisions. See BICKEL, supra note 5, at 30 (“Frankfurter set apart, as
fittingly exercised by judges, the Commerce Clause jurisdiction, in which judgments
denying power to the States are subject to Congressional revision.”). 
More broadly, it is worth noting that many of the cases that best exemplify the Court’s 
divergent approaches to the Fourteenth Amendment and dormant Commerce Clause were 
decided in the same timeframe and by many of the same justices. For example, the
Substantive Due Process cases, Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 
483 (1955) and Ferguson, 372 U.S. 726, were decided in 1955 and 1963; the Equal
Protection cases, Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) and Personnel Administrator 
of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), were decided in 1976 and 1979; and the 
dormant Commerce Clause cases, Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959); 
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333 (1977); and City
of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978), were decided in 1959, 1977 and 1978.  
The participation of many of the same justices in cases passively reviewing legislation 
challenged under the Fourteenth Amendment and actively reviewing legislation challenged
under the dormant Commerce Clause shows these divergent approaches are not just the 
result of different justices or judicial philosophies prevailing at different times. 
224
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to defer to state legislatures, noting that he would “defer[] in two senses; 
in many instances he deferred judgment, or in rendering judgment he 
deferred to the political institutions.”7 
Concerns about judicial overreach have significantly impacted the Court’s 
review in Fourteenth Amendment cases.  The Court has constrained its review 
of legislative decisions challenged on Fourteenth Amendment grounds in 
at least two ways.  First, as discussed in Section II.A.1, the Court has refused 
to strike down laws under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
even if there is evidence that the law’s main purpose is to benefit an interest 
group.8 Second, as discussed in Section II.A.2, the Court has refused
to invalidate laws under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause 
unless the challenged laws discriminate expressly or intentionally.9 Moreover,
the Court will not searchingly review the available evidence to uncover 
discriminatory intent.10 
As to Frankfurter, he joined the majority in actively reviewing and striking down legislation
challenged under the dormant Commerce Clause, see Bibb, 359 U.S. 529–30; Dean Milk
Co., 340 U.S. at 356, while at the same time vehemently opposing active review under the
Fourteenth Amendment, see Trop, 356 U.S. at 119–20 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), and
joining the Court in refusing to engage in such active review, see Williamson, 348 U.S. at 
488. Frankfurter was not on the Court when each of the cases discussed in this Article
were decided, but he is a notable example, in part because of Bickel’s emphasis on his 
restrained approach to Fourteenth Amendment cases. 
 7.  BICKEL, supra note 5, at 29; see also Louis H. Pollack, Mr. Justice Frankfurter: 
Judgment and the Fourteenth Amendment, 67 YALE L.J. 304, 316–17 (1957) (“When
Frankfurter determines that he must address himself to the ultimate substantive issues, he 
is, of course, guided by canons of judicial restraint as compelling as those that caution him
against reaching such issues before they are duly presented. . . . Especially is this true of
Justices exercising the Supreme Court’s power, under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due 
process clause, to veto state action.”).
8. See Williamson, 348 U.S. at 487 (“[I]t is for the legislature, not the courts, to balance
the advantages and disadvantages of [a law].”).
9. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 247–48 (explaining the Court would not 
declare unconstitutional laws that do facially categorize on the basis of race without
evidence of intent to discriminate).
10.  See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 277–79 (explaining that intent to discriminate means
the legislature passed a law because of its recognizable effects on a specific group, not in
spite of its recognizable effects on a specific group); see also Reva B. Siegel, The Supreme
Court, 2012 Term—Foreword: Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20–21 (2013) 
(“The Court emphasized differences between standards that Congress might provide under 
Title VII and those the Court might impose under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments, 
observing that the disparate impact inquiry ‘involves a more probing judicial review of, 
and less deference to, the seemingly reasonable acts of administrators and executives than 
is appropriate under the Constitution where special racial impact, without discriminatory
purpose, is claimed.’” (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 247)). 
225










   
   
  
  




   
   
 
    
  
    
   
   
    
  
 
         
 
  
       
        
  
   
   
   




1.  Substantive Due Process 
As to the Court’s refusal to strike down certain laws under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the Court carefully scrutinizes 
only a narrow class of laws challenged as Substantive Due Process11 
violations. When addressing Substantive Due Process claims, the Court applies
strict scrutiny to laws that, in its view, impinge on fundamental rights.12 
When the Court determines that a law does not affect fundamental rights,
it will not closely scrutinize it, even if there is evidence that the law’s  
purpose is to benefit an interest group rather than achieve a legitimate 
government end and even if there is evidence that it may harm other 
groups.13 In these cases, the Court will uphold the challenged law as long 
as there is some permissible end the law might be designed to achieve.14 
This standard is easy to satisfy, as there is almost always a permissible end 
that a law might achieve.15 
The Court has upheld laws even when, as in Williamson v. Lee Optical
of Oklahoma, the state did not offer any justification for the law.16  In that
case, the Court held that although the “law may exact a needless, wasteful
requirement in many cases. . . . it is for the legislature, not the courts, to
balance the advantages and disadvantages of the new requirement.”17  The
Court also opined that, “the law need not be in every respect logically
consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that there is an
evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular 
legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.”18 “The day is gone,” 
the Williamson Court concluded, “when this Court uses the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory 
of business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise,
improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.”19  In 
Ferguson v. Skrupa, the Court reiterated this position, saying, “[l]egislative
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3 (“[N]or shall any state deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”). 
12. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (applying strict 
scrutiny to a law that interfered with a married couple’s right to use contraception); Pierce 
v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (applying strict scrutiny  to  a law that  
interfered with the right of parents and guardians to direct their children’s education). 
13. See Williamson, 348 U.S. at 487–88. 
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See generally id.
17. Id. at 487. 
18. Id. at 487–88. 
19. Id. at 488. 
226
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bodies have broad scope to experiment with economic problems” and it 
would not “sit as a ‘superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation.’”20 
2.  Equal Protection 
As to Equal Protection Clause21 cases, the Court focuses on laws that 
explicitly discriminate against members of certain “suspect class[es]”22— 
those that explicitly discriminate based on race,23 national origin,24 gender,25 
and sexual orientation.26 The Court carefully scrutinizes laws that explicitly 
distinguish between people on the basis of suspect classifications, applying
either strict or intermediate scrutiny and usually invalidating these laws.27 
By contrast, the Court has been reluctant to strike down laws that do not
on their face categorize individuals based on suspect classifications. The
Court has held that such laws violate the Equal Protection Clause only if 
the legislature had a discriminatory purpose.28 As the Court said in Washington
v. Davis, “[s]tanding alone, [disparate impact] does not trigger the rule . . . 
that racial [or other suspect] classifications are to be subjected to the strictest
scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations.”29  In
Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, the Court defined discriminatory intent
as “impl[ying] more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of
consequences. . . . It implies that the decision maker . . . selected or reaffirmed
20. 372 U.S. 726, 730–31 (1963) (quoting Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 
U.S. 421, 423 (1952)). 
21. U.S.CONST. amend XIV, § 1, cl. 4 (“[N]or shall any state . . . deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
22. Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 596 (2008). 
23. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967).
24. See, e.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 640–41 (1948). 
25. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973). 
26. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603–05 (2015) (holding that
unequal treatment of individuals because of sexual orientation is unconstitutional, at least 
to the extent that the unequal treatment “interlock[s]” with fundamental rights); see also
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 774 (2013); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634– 
35 (1996). 
27. See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 691–92 (Powell, J., concurring) (applying intermediate 
scrutiny and invalidating a law that distinguishes on the basis of gender); Loving, 388 U.S. 
at 10 (applying strict scrutiny and invalidating a law that distinguishes on the basis of 
race).
28. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976). 
29. Id. at 242 (citation omitted) (citing McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964));
see also Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–66
(1977). 
227
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a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in 
spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”30 
The Court has also sharply restricted litigants’ ability to prove discriminatory 
purpose.31 It has explained that assessing “[t]he calculus of effects . . . is
a legislative and not a judicial responsibility.”32 As a result, the Court will
not invalidate a law with an implicit but foreseeable discriminatory impact,33 
even if there are less discriminatory means that would achieve the same 
purpose.34 This rule, as scholars such as Reva Siegel have pointed out, makes 
it easy to avoid liability because as long as legislators do not explicitly state 
that they are acing from animus, they can enact laws they know will harm 
certain groups.35 
B.  The Active Approach in Dormant Commerce Clause Cases
The dormant Commerce Clause prohibits states from passing laws that
excessively burden interstate commerce.36 State laws can violate the
dormant Commerce Clause in two ways. First, a state law can explicitly 
discriminate against out-of-state commerce.37  The Court almost always
invalidates these laws.38 Such laws are equivalent to laws that violate the 
30. 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). 
31. See id. at 271–72. 
32. Id. at 272 (first citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); and then 
citing San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)).
33. See id. at 271–72; see also Siegel, supra note 10, at 20.
34. See Feeney, 422 U.S. at 288 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
35. See Siegel, supra note 10, at 20 (“Feeney insulated facially neutral action with
foreseeable racial disparate impact from constitutional challenge by offering federal 
judges tools, including the requirement of proving specific intent, that judges could use to 
make plaintiffs’ burden of proof impossible, for all practical purposes, to discharge.”); see 
also Serena J. Hoy, Interpreting Equal Protection: Congress, the Court, and the Civil Rights 
Acts, 16 J.L. & POL. 381, 386 (2000) (“The Court’s current approach makes it virtually
impossible for plaintiffs to bring a constitutional challenge to facially neutral governmental 
acts disproportionately harming classes protected under the Fourteenth Amendment, even
where those acts serve no legitimate purpose or are the product of unconscious racism or
sexism.”). 
36. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 545 U.S. 429, 433
(2005) (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 379 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)); Camps Newfound/ 
Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 565, 574 (1997); H.P. Hood & Sons, 
Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 537–38 (1949). 
37. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978) (“Both on its 
face and in its plain effect, [the statute] violates this principle of nondiscrimination.”). 
38. See id. at 626–27 (“[W]hatever New Jersey’s ultimate purpose, it may not be
accomplished by discriminating against articles of commerce coming from outside the 
State unless there is some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently.”); see
also Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 520 U.S. at 565 (“[A law] discriminates on its face 
against interstate commerce [by] expressly distinguish[ing] between entities that serve a
principally interstate clientele and those that primarily serve an intrastate market, singling 
228
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Fourteenth Amendment by explicitly discriminating against people on the 
basis of a suspect classification.39 As such, there is no real contrast between 
how the Court treats explicit discrimination in Fourteenth Amendment 
and dormant Commerce Clause cases.
The focus here is on the second type of violation, state laws that violate 
the dormant Commerce Clause without expressly discriminating against
out-of-state commerce.40 A statute that does not expressly discriminate against 
out-of-state commerce—where the “effects on interstate commerce are  
only incidental”—violates the dormant Commerce Clause if it fails a
judicially created balancing test.41 The balancing test assesses whether “the 
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the 
putative local benefits.”42 If it is, the law fails the balancing test and it is 
invalid.43 
In these dormant Commerce Clause cases, concerns about underenforcement, 
not judicial overreach, have a significant impact on the Court’s review.  
out [entities] that serve mostly in-staters for beneficial tax treatment, and penalizing those 
[entities] that do a principally interstate business. Such laws are virtually per se invalid.”).  
But see Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151–52 (1986) (“The evidence in this case amply 
supports the District Court’s findings that Maine’s ban on the importation of live baitfish 
serves legitimate local purposes that could not adequately be served by available 
nondiscriminatory alternatives. This is not a case of arbitrary discrimination against interstate 
commerce; the record suggests that Maine has legitimate reasons, ‘apart from their origin, 
to treat out-of-state baitfish differently,’ . . .” (citation omitted) (quoting City of Phila., 437
U.S. at 627)).
39. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
40. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (citing Huron Portland
Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960)) (explaining that a statute can




43. See id.; see also Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93,
99 (1994) (“[T]he first step in analyzing any law subject to judicial scrutiny under the
negative Commerce Clause is to determine whether it ‘regulates evenhandedly with only
“incidental” effects on interstate commerce, or discriminates against interstate commerce.’. . . 
As we use the term here, ‘discrimination’ simply means differential treatment of in-state
and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter. If a 
restriction on commerce is discriminatory, it is virtually per se invalid. . . . By contrast,
nondiscriminatory regulations that have only incidental effects on interstate commerce are
valid unless ‘the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the 
putative local benefits.’” (citations omitted) (first quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 
322, 336 (1979); then quoting Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 344 n.6 
(1992); and then quoting Pike, 397 U.S. at 142)). 
229








   
  
      
   
 
   
    





     
 
  
   
   
          
        
    
 
     
      
     
  
      
 
     
  
 
Justices—despite often expressing the concern about invalidating laws
based on a “vague” constitutional provision in Fourteenth Amendment 
cases44—have not emphasized this concern in dormant Commerce Clause 
cases.45 Instead, the justices—including, notably, Justice Frankfurter, who
expressed particular concern about judicial overreach in Fourteenth Amendment
cases46—have emphasized the concern that the dormant Commerce 
Clause would be underenforced without judicial intervention.47 
The Court’s approach to dormant Commerce Clause cases contrasts in
two significant ways with its approach in Fourteenth Amendment cases.
First, when determining whether a state law violates the dormant Commerce
Clause, the Court has carefully considered evidence of how well the legislature’s
means effectuate its purported permissible ends.48 The contrast between 
this approach to the dormant Commerce Clause and the Court’s approach 
to Substantive Due Process cases is discussed in Section II.B.1. Second,
the Court has carefully analyzed a law’s means-end fit even when reviewing 
laws that do not expressly discriminate.49 The contrast between this approach
to the dormant Commerce Clause and the Court’s approach to Equal Protection 
cases is discussed in Section II.B.2. 
1.  Scrutiny of Means-End Fit: Contrast with Substantive 
Due Process Cases 
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission50 exemplifies 
the first contrast.  In dormant Commerce Clause cases, unlike in Substantive 
Due Process cases, the Court will searchingly evaluate the evidence in the
44. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731 (1963); see also, e.g., Williamson v. Lee 
Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 486–88 (1955). 
45. See, e.g., City of Phila., 437 U.S. at 623; Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. 
Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 353–54 (1977). 
46. For a discussion of Justice Frankfurter’s view of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and its contrast to his approach to dormant Commerce Clause cases, see supra notes 2–7 
and accompanying text. Note Bickel pointed out that Frankfurter treated the Commerce 
Clause differently from other constitutional provisions. See BICKEL, supra note 5, at 30
(“Frankfurter set apart, as fittingly exercised by judges, the Commerce Clause jurisdiction,
in which judgments denying power to the states are subject to Congressional revision.”). 
47. See City of Phila., 437 U.S. at 623 (“Although the Constitution gives Congress 
the power to regulate commerce among the States, many subjects of potential federal
regulation under that power inevitably escape congressional attention ‘because of their
local character and their number and diversity.’” (quoting S.C. State Highway Dep’t v.  
Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 185 (1938))); see also Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359
U.S. 520, 529–30 (1959); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 356 (1951). 
48. See Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 677 (1981); City of Phila., 
437 U.S. at 626; Hunt, 432 U.S. at 350. 
49. See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 353–54; Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. 
50.  432 U.S. 333. 
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record to determine whether a law is well suited to accomplish the legislature’s 
stated goals.51 
In Hunt, the Court addressed a law about apple labeling.52  The Court
acknowledged a state’s interest in preventing confusion in the marketing 
of foodstuffs, but specified three reasons why “the challenged statute does
remarkably little to further that laudable goal at least with respect to Washington 
apples and grades.”53  The Court explained that, first, the statute “permits
the marketing of closed containers of apples under no grades at all.  Such
a result can hardly be thought to eliminate the problems of deception and 
confusion created by the multiplicity of differing state grades.”54 Second,
“although the statute is ostensibly a consumer protection measure, it directs
its primary efforts, not at the consuming public at large, but at apple wholesalers
and brokers who are the principal purchasers of closed containers of 
apples.”55  The Court noted apple wholesalers, to whom the law was directed,
are likely the most knowledgeable about apples and noted that the law
“does nothing at all to purify the flow of information at the retail level” where 
the information may have been more useful.56 Third, the Court added that
because “Washington grades are in all cases equal or superior to their 
USDA counterparts, they could only ‘deceive’ or ‘confuse’ a consumer to
his benefit.”57 Finally, the Court concluded that “nondiscriminatory alternatives
to the outright ban of Washington State grades are readily available.”58 
After this careful evaluation of the evidence, the Court invalidated the 
law.59 
51. Compare id. at 353, with Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963). 
52. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 337. The North Carolina law at issue required closed containers
of apples sold in the state to display either the United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA) grade or a notice indicating no grade at all. Id. The law prohibited displaying 
state grades. Id. Washington State had contradictory labeling requirements and required 
Washington apples shipped in interstate commerce to display the Washington state grade, 
which reflected quality standards higher than the USDA standard. Id. at 336. Washington 
apple growers challenged the North Carolina law because its effect was to either prevent
Washington apple growers from benefitting from Washington’s more stringent grading
standards or prevent the sale of Washington apples in North Carolina. Id. at 352. 
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Hunt is not the only example of the Court’s thorough examination of
the record in a dormant Commerce Clause case. In Kassel v. Consolidated
Freightways Corp., the Court confronted an Iowa law banning a certain 
kind of truck—sixty-five foot doubles.60 The Iowa legislature put forth a
safety rationale for the law, explaining that sixty-five foot doubles were 
more dangerous than other types of truck.61 Rather than accepting Iowa’s
safety rationale, the Court reviewed the record to make its own safety
assessments.62  Reviewing the record before it, the Court pointed to ways
that sixty-five foot doubles were safer than other trucks and disputed the 
evidence of other trucks’ safety advantages.63  After reviewing the evidence,
the Court concluded, “[s]tatistical studies supported the view that 65-foot
doubles are at least as safe overall as 55-foot singles and 60-foot doubles.”64 
The Court also determined that the “law substantially burden[ed] interstate 
commerce.”65 As in Hunt, after carefully examining the evidence, the Court 
invalidated the law.66 
Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc.67 is yet another example. In Bibb, 
the court invalidated an Illinois statute requiring trucks and trailers to use 
a certain type of mudguard.68 Illinois’s purported reason for passing the
legislation was that curved mudguards were safer than straight mudguards.69 
Echoing Kassel, the Court carefully reviewed evidence of the relative safety
of curved and flat mudguards and the burden the Illinois law placed on
interstate commerce.70 It concluded that the curved mudguards required
by Illinois law were not necessarily safer and that the burden on interstate
commerce was “rather massive.”71  The Court invalidated the law.72 
The searching analysis the Court undertakes in these cases is precisely
the sort of analysis the Court explicitly refused to undertake in Substantive 
Due Process cases such as Williamson, where the Court said it would not
use “the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down 
state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they
may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school
60.  450 U.S. 662, 671 (1981). 
61. Id. at 671–72. 
62. Id. at 671–73. 
63. See id. at 672–73. 
64. Id. at 673. 
65. Id. at 674. 
66. Id.
67.  359 U.S. 520 (1959). 
68. Id. at 529–30. 
69. Id. at 525. A mudguard is a flap placed behind the wheel of a vehicle to prevent 
water and mud from being thrown off the wheel.  Id. at 521 n.1.
70. Id. at 525–28. 
71.  Id. at 525, 528. 
72. Id. at 529–30. 
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of thought,”73 and Ferguson, where it said it would not “sit as a 
‘superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation.’”74 
2.  Scrutiny of Non-Facially Discriminatory Laws: Contrast 
with Equal Protection Cases 
The second contrast between the Court’s approach to dormant Commerce 
Clause and Fourteenth Amendment cases is that in dormant Commerce 
Clause cases the Court is willing to scrutinize laws that do not facially
discriminate. The law at issue in Hunt, for example, is facially neutral: 
“All apples sold, offered for sale or shipped into this State in closed containers
shall bear on the container, bag or other receptacle, no grade other than 
the applicable U.S. grade or standard or the marking ‘unclassified,’ ‘not 
graded’ or ‘grade not determined.’”75 Yet the Court carefully scrutinized, 
and ultimately invalidated, this law.76 The laws at issue in Bibb77 and Kassel78 
are facially neutral as well, but as in Hunt, the Court carefully scrutinized 
the laws. In Equal Protection cases, the Court does not scrutinize laws
that are not discriminatory on their face.79 The Court defers to the legislature’s 
judgment on how to balance the benefits and burdens of a law.80 The  
Court’s careful scrutiny of the facially neutral law in Hunt, Bibb, and Kassel
is a significant contrast with its approach to Equal Protection cases such
as Washington v. Davis and Feeney, where the Court said assessing “[t]he
calculus of effects” of a law that does not explicitly discriminate is “a 
legislative and not a judicial responsibility.”81 
73. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955). 
74. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731 (1963) (quoting Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. 
v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952)). 
75. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 339 (1977) (quoting
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 106-189.1 (1973)). 
76. See id. at 351–53. 
77. See Bibb, 359 U.S. at 521–23. 
78. See Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 671–72 (1981). 
79. See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 278–79 (1979) (refusing to 
carefully scrutinize a law that did not discriminate on its face, even though its discriminatory
effects were foreseeable).
80. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265
(1977) (“In fact, it is because legislators and administrators are properly concerned with 
balancing numerous competing considerations that courts refrain from reviewing the merits
of their decisions, absent a showing of arbitrariness or irrationality.”). 
81. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 272 (first citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); 
and then citing San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)). 
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There is an interesting wrinkle in the Court’s handling of facially neutral 
statutes in dormant Commerce Clause cases. It is not clear whether the 
Court requires discriminatory intent in dormant Commerce Clause cases,
or instead will invalidate laws simply because of their discriminatory effect
or disparate impact. While this wrinkle warrants a brief discussion, the 
key point to keep in mind is that there is a contrast with Equal Protection 
cases either way. 
Cases generally indicate that discriminatory effect is sufficient grounds 
for the court to invalidate a law,82 but the Court has not been perfectly
clear on this point.83 Hunt best demonstrates the ambiguity as to whether 
discriminatory intent is required. The Court explained, “[d]espite the statute’s 
facial neutrality, the Commission suggests that its discriminatory impact
on interstate commerce was not an unintended byproduct and there are
some indications in the record to that effect.”84 But the Court also added:
we need not ascribe an economic protection motive to the North Carolina
Legislature to resolve this case; we conclude that the challenged statute cannot
stand insofar as it prohibits the display of Washington State grades even if enacted
for the declared purpose of protecting consumers from deception and fraud in the
marketplace.85 
The Court’s assertion that it did not need to ascribe a protectionist motive 
to the legislature suggests discriminatory effect is sufficient grounds to  
invalidate a statute.  This statement, however, is arguably dicta because the 
court also points to compelling evidence of the North Carolina legislature’s 
discriminatory intent.86  Subsequent cases do not resolve the ambiguity.87 
Whichever way this ambiguity is resolved, the Court’s handling of 
dormant Commerce Clause cases differs from its handling of Fourteenth 
Amendment cases. In Equal Protection cases, the Court has not only required 
a showing of discriminatory intent but also made it virtually impossible 
82. See, e.g., Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270 (1984) (“A finding 
that state legislation constitutes ‘economic protectionism’ may be made on the basis of 
either discriminatory purpose . . . or discriminatory effect . . . .” (citations omitted) (first
quoting Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 333 (1977); and then
citing City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978))). 
83. See, e.g., id. at 273 (“We therefore conclude that the Hawaii liquor tax exemption 
for okolehao and pineapple wine violated the Commerce Clause because it had both the 
purpose and effect of discriminating in favor of local products.”).
84. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 352. 
85. Id. at 352–53. 
86. See id. at 352. 
87. Compare Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. 456, 471–72 (1981)
(holding that discriminatory intent was necessary to prior decisions striking down statutes 
as violating the dormant Commerce Clause), with Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp.,
450 U.S. 662, 670, 675–76 (1981) (holding that discriminatory intent was not necessary
for the Court to strike down a statute as violating the dormant Commerce Clause).
234
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for plaintiffs to make such a showing.88 In dormant Commerce Clause
cases, either the Court does not require discriminatory intent or it willingly
searches for discriminatory intent, making it possible for plaintiffs to make
a showing of discriminatory intent.89 Either way, the cases discussed in 
this section make clear that the Court defers much less to legislatures in 
dormant Commerce Clause cases than in Fourteenth Amendment cases.
III. ASSESSING THE SUPREME COURT’S DIVERGENT APPROACH TO
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND DORMANT 
COMMERCE CLAUSE90 
The different levels of deference the Court applies when evaluating 
legislation challenged under the Fourteenth Amendment, on the one hand,
and the dormant Commerce Clause, on the other, raise the question of
whether its current, divergent approach is a good one. This section points 
out that the Court has never explained why it applies one level of deference 
in Fourteenth Amendment cases and a different level of deference in dormant 
Commerce Clause cases. It then explains that there is not a principled 
justification for the Court’s current approach. 
88. See Siegel, supra note 10, at 20; see also Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. 
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 271 (1977). 
89. See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 352–53. 
90. Before moving on, one additional line of cases warrants mention—antitrust 
state action exemption cases. The question addressed in state action exemption cases is 
similar to the question addressed in dormant Commerce Clause cases: How much leeway
does a state have in making laws that regulate or affect business? See, e.g., City of Lafayette v.
La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 391 (1978). The Court’s application of this doctrine 
is more similar to its application of the Fourteenth Amendment: The Court defers to state 
legislatures. See id. at 393. The Court does not evaluate the efficacy of, or motivations 
behind, the legislation but gives the state leeway to promulgate regulations that would clearly
violate the Sherman Act if accomplished through private agreements. See generally id. 
The Court also does not seek to determine if some group—or state—is disadvantaged by 
the legislation. See generally id.; Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). When considered 
along with dormant Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment cases, the state action
exemption cases offer additional evidence that the Court does not have a systematic view 
of when it should defer to state legislatures and when it should actively review state legislation.
This additional evidence that the Court does not have a systematic approach to deference 
is all the more reason to see if the Court’s current approach can be justified and, if not,
suggest a new approach. 
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A.  The Supreme Court Has Not Explained Its Current, Divergent 
Approach to Fourteenth Amendment and Dormant 
Commerce Clause Cases 
The Court has explained why it defers to state legislatures in Fourteenth 
Amendment cases and separately explained why it defers little to state
legislatures in dormant Commerce Clause cases. The Court has not, however, 
offered an explanation that makes clear why it treats these two types of 
cases differently. 
Addressing its deference to state legislatures in Fourteenth Amendment
cases, in Feeney, the Court explained, “the Fourteenth Amendment ‘cannot 
be made a refuge from ill-advised laws.’”91 It acknowledged that certain laws 
“may reflect unwise policy” but determined that the threat of unwise policy 
does not justify the Court’s interference.92 Similarly, in Washington v. Davis, 
the Court expressed the desire to give legislatures leeway to serve “ends 
otherwise within the power of government to pursue.”93 Most emphatically, 
in Ferguson, the Court explained, “courts do not substitute their social and
economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected
to pass laws.”94 
Addressing its lack of deference to state legislatures in dormant Commerce 
Clause cases, in City of Philadelphia, the Court explained, “[a]lthough the 
Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate commerce among the 
States, many subjects of potential federal regulation under that power
inevitably escape congressional attention ‘because of their local character
and their number and diversity.’”95 According to the Court’s own account,
then, the Court is willing to interfere with legislative decisions in dormant 
Commerce Clause cases because it perceives a risk that Congress will
underenforce constitutional provisions.96  But the Court hesitates to interfere
with legislative decisions in Fourteenth Amendment cases because it recognizes 
the so-called countermajoritarian difficulty and, as an unelected body, does
not want to interfere with the decisions of democratically elected legislatures.97 
91. 442 U.S. 256, 281 (1979) (quoting District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U.S. 138,
150 (1909)). 
92. Id.
93.  426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). 
94.  372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963). 
95. 437 U.S. 617, 623 (1978) (quoting S.C. State Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., 
303 U.S. 177, 185 (1938)). 
96. See id.; see also Saul Levmore, Interstate Exploitation and Judicial Intervention, 69 
VA.L.REV. 563, 569 (1983) (quoting Ernest J. Brown, The Open Economy: Justice Frankfurter
and the Position of the Judiciary, 67 YALE L.J. 219, 220–21 (1957)). 
97.  See Ferguson, 372 U.S. at 730 (quoting Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 
388 (1932)). See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE 
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (2d ed. 1986). 
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The problem with the Court’s explanations for how it handles Fourteenth 
Amendment and dormant Commerce Clause cases is that both explanations
apply to both types of cases. Interference with legislative decisions is just 
as countermajoritarian in dormant Commerce Clause cases as Fourteenth 
Amendment cases. The risk of underenforcing constitutional provisions 
applies to Fourteenth Amendment cases as well as dormant Commerce
Clause cases.98 The Court has said nothing about why it emphasizes one
consideration in one type of case and the other consideration in the other
type of case. Consequently, the Court has not satisfactorily explained why
it takes an active approach when reviewing laws challenged under the 
dormant Commerce Clause and a passive approach when reviewing laws
challenged under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
B.  There Is No Persuasive Justification for the Supreme Court’s 
Divergent Approach to Fourteenth Amendment and 
Dormant Commerce Clause Cases 
Having established that the Court has not provided a persuasive justification 
for its current practice, this section turns to asking whether there is a
persuasive justification that the Court has not articulated. This section first 
briefly addresses two arguments that may seem promising but explains 
why they are implausible. It then addresses a more plausible argument but 
explains why this argument is ultimately unpersuasive as well. 
The first implausible argument in support of reviewing dormant Commerce
Clause cases more aggressively than Fourteenth Amendment cases is
prioritizing important issues—arguing that the Court should defer less to 
legislatures when the issues before it are more important, and that enforcing
the dormant Commerce Clause is more important. That argument is 
unsatisfactory for two reasons. 
First, there is not a foolproof mechanism for determining, in general,
which issues are most important. The lack of such a mechanism is the key
objection to the argument that the Court should defer less when the issues
before it are more important. But it is also worth pointing out that,
specifically as to the issues raised by the dormant Commerce Clause and
Fourteenth Amendment cases discussed here, it seems implausible that  
any acceptable mechanism would determine that the consumer confusion 
98. See City of Phila., 437 U.S. at 623. 
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over apple labels, at issue in Hunt,99 is more important than the race-based 
barriers to employment, at issue in Washington v. Davis,100 or the gender-
based barriers, at issue in Feeney.101 Second, it is not clear that the
importance of an issue would be a good indicator of whether courts should
actively review a legislature’s decisions about that issue. An issue could
be extremely important but best left to the democratic process and ill-
suited to active judicial review. For example, setting tax rates to determine
how much people and entities should pay is an important issue but also 
plausibly one better left to the democratic process without active review 
from judges.
A second—also implausible—argument in support of reviewing dormant 
Commerce Clause cases more aggressively than Fourteenth Amendment 
cases is judicial competence—arguing that the Court is better equipped to 
actively review dormant Commerce Clause cases than Fourteenth Amendment 
cases. That argument is unsatisfactory because in both types of cases, justices
are asked to engage in exactly the same type of analysis: assessing the 
rationality, or means-end fit, of a law, and assessing whether the legislature 
had discriminatory intent when passing the law.102 Because the analysis
in dormant Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment cases is effectively
identical, judicial competence does not justify actively reviewing a legislature’s
decisions in dormant Commerce Clause cases but not in Fourteenth Amendment 
cases.
There is, however, a more plausible argument in support of more active 
review in dormant Commerce Clause cases than Fourteenth Amendment 
cases—the stickiness of the Court’s decisions. The Court’s decisions in 
Fourteenth Amendment cases are hard to reverse, or sticky.103  It might
follow that because its decisions in Fourteenth Amendment cases are  
sticky, the Court should be hesitant to strike down legislation challenged 
on Fourteenth Amendment grounds.104 The Court’s decisions in dormant 
Commerce Clause cases are easier to reverse, or less sticky.105  Congress
has significant power to police interstate commerce.106 As a result of this 
99.  See 432 U.S. 333, 353–54 (1977). 
100.  See 426 U.S. 229, 232 (1976). 
101.  See 442 U.S. 256, 259 (1979). 
102. See id.; Hunt, 432 U.S. at 353–54; Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348
U.S. 483, 488 (1955). 
103. See, e.g., Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406–07 (1932) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting) (“[For some] cases involving the Federal Constitution, . . . correction through 
legislative action is practically impossible.”).
104. This is essentially the argument Justice Frankfurter makes against active review 
in Fourteenth Amendment cases. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 119–20 (1958) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
105. See Levmore, supra note 96, at 569–70. 
106. See id. at 570.
238
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power, Congress can more easily override the Court’s decisions in dormant
Commerce Clause cases.107 It might follow that because its decisions in 
dormant Commerce Clause cases are not very sticky, the Court should be 
more willing to engage in active review knowing Congress can always
overrule its decisions if they turn out to be “inadequate.”108 
Saul Levmore explains this argument: 
One might view the federal judiciary then as a surrogate or agency of Congress 
instructed to protect the national interest by overturning those state actions which
an attentive Congress would disapprove. This role requires that judicial decisions 
not be on inflexible and irreversible constitutional grounds. . . . That Congress could
itself police interstate aggression strengthens, rather than weakens, the case for 
common-law judicial activism.  If, compared to Congress’ wishes, the federal courts
prove overzealous in protecting free trade, insufficiently deferential to state
interests and determinations, or simply inadequate in exploring and interpreting
facts, then Congress can step in and use its commerce power to override the courts.109 
Here, Levmore expresses the view that the Court can engage in active review 
in dormant Commerce Clause cases because Congress can override the 
Court if the Court reaches a conclusion that Congress does not approve.110 
This statement does not address the contrast between dormant Commerce
Clause and Fourteenth Amendment cases; however, it implies Congress’s
inability to reverse the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment decisions means
the Court should not engage in active review in those cases.111 
If there is any argument in favor of the Court’s current approach, the
stickiness argument is the most persuasive. Still, this argument is ultimately
unpersuasive for at least two reasons. First, it contradicts the Court’s own
reason for active review in dormant Commerce Clause cases. The Court 
has defended active review in such cases by arguing that Congress will
not enforce the dormant Commerce Clause as much as it should, saying 
“many subjects of potential federal regulation under [the dormant Commerce 
Clause] power inevitably escape congressional attention.”112 If the Court 
107. See id. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. at 569–70 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
110.  Bickel also gestures at this argument.  See BICKEL, supra note 5, at 30 (“Frankfurter 
set apart, as fittingly exercised by judges, the Commerce Clause jurisdiction, in which judgments 
denying power to the states are subject to Congressional revision.”). 
111. In particular, the claim that “[t]his role requires that judicial decisions not be on 
inflexible and irreversible constitutional grounds” suggests Levmore would not be in favor
of active review in Fourteenth Amendment cases because Fourteenth Amendment decisions
are inflexible on constitutional grounds.  Levmore, supra note 96. 
112. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623 (1978). 
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is worried Congress will not pay enough attention to enforcing the dormant
Commerce Clause, it should also be worried Congress will not pay enough 
attention to reversing its dormant Commerce Clause decisions.113 It is 
inconsistent for the Court to use concern about Congress’s tendency to ignore
dormant Commerce Clause issues as a defense of active review and at the 
same time use Congress’s ability to reverse the Court as a defense of active 
review.
Second, just because an action can be reversed does not mean it is the
best course of action to take. The observation that Congress can reverse
the Court’s dormant Commerce Clause decisions does not resolve whether it
is desirable for the Court to engage in active review in dormant Commerce
Clause cases in the first place. Nor does it meaningfully resolve whether
it is undesirable for the Court to engage in active review in Fourteenth
Amendment cases.114 
Determining when the Court should engage in active review or passive 
review requires considering the proper role of the Court in constitutional
cases.  Considering the proper role of the Court in constitutional cases requires
asking, what is the point of the Constitution? “It is hardly original or profound
to answer this question by observing that the framers chose to create their 
government in a constitution deliberately made difficult to change as a way
of preventing tyranny of the majority, of protecting the rights of the minority 
from oppression by social majorities.”115  “[T]he role of the courts is to make
sure that the democratic process remains open and inclusive, and that unfairly 
excluded minority groups are protected.”116 
113. Like the Court, Levmore also articulates this worry. See Levmore, supra note 96
(“Victimized states, producers, and consumers might therefore seek congressional action
to check interstate aggression. But what if Congress cannot focus its attention on the myriad 
local laws and practices that penetrate state borders in one way or another? In such cases, 
congressional action may eventually overturn an aggressive state law but only after considerable
delay.  Judicial intervention would restore the benefits of free trade more quickly.”).
114. By way of analogy, the fact that you can return a purchase does not necessarily
mean you should make that purchase, or the fact that you can stop dating someone does
not necessarily mean you should go on a date with that person. It is not that the reversibility of
an action is irrelevant to whether that action is wise.  You might take into account the return
policy when deciding whether to buy something.  You might consider whether to go on a 
second date with someone less carefully than whether to move in with that person, in part
because it is much easier to tell someone you are not interested in a third date than to move 
out of a shared home. But there are considerations beyond the reversibility of an action.
A flexible return policy is not itself a reason to buy something you do not need or like— 
especially instead of something you need and like. The fact that you do not have to keep
dating someone is not itself a reason to go on a date with that person—especially if you do not
enjoy the person’s company or if it will prevent other dating opportunities that interest you 
more.
115. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT 8 (2014). 
116. David A. Strauss, Is Carolene Products Obsolete?, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1251, 
1269. 
240
POST PATTI PAGES.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/18/2019 11:31 AM        
     
  
       
    
     
 
   
   
 
   
  
 
     
  
      
        
  
   
    
         
    
    
   
    
 
 
   
      
         
  
    
     
       
   
      
      
     
             
       
         
      
    
   
       
    
   
[VOL. 56:  221, 2019] Judicial Deference and Political Power 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
If the role of the Constitution is to protect minority groups from oppression
because a democratic system entails the risk of tyranny of the majority, it
follows that in determining how actively to review allegedly unconstitutional
legislation, the Court should consider the political power of the plaintiff 
challenging the law.117 In short, any conflicts that can be resolved fairly 
through the democratic political process should be resolved through the
democratic process; where the democratic process is at risk of treating a 
group unfairly, the Court should play a greater role by actively reviewing 
allegedly unconstitutional legislation.118 
117. The Court and legal scholars have frequently made this argument. The Court 
first raised this issue in the famous United States v. Carolene Products, Co. footnote four.  
304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (“[W]hether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities 
may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a 
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”). The Court then explicitly addressed 
political powerlessness in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez. See 411
U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (“[T]he traditional indicia of suspectnesss [includes classes that are] saddled 
with . . . disabilities, or subjected to . . . a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated 
to . . . a position of political powerlessness . . . .”). Legal scholars have frequently discussed the
role of political power—and powerlessness. See, e.g., Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Political
Powerlessness, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1527, 1536, 1542–45 (2015) (noting that “[t]he powerlessness 
doctrine has been around for a long time” and summarizing scholarly work on political
powerlessness).
118. This argument also echoes arguments by philosopher Philip Pettit:
In order for citizens to control the state in such a way that it is not a dominating 
force in their lives, it is not enough for them to enjoy collective control over those in
power. Such collective control would be consistent with the domination of
individuals who fail to go alone with the collectively expressed wishes of the group. 
PHILIP PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE’S TERMS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY AND MODEL OF DEMOCRACY
209 (2012).  Pettit also argues, 
The problem of the sticky divide [between the minority and majority on certain
issues] is that there are independently identifiable individuals who, on certain 
issues, are more or less bound to be on the losing side. It is important that the 
individuals who are bound to lose are independently identified—say, identified 
on the basis of creed or colour, race or sexual orientation—not identified just by 
their disposition to vote a certain way on those issues. Otherwise, we would have to
say that just by being unlucky enough to choose minority views on various issues 
people would be deprived of access to equal influence. Otherwise, indeed, we would
have to say that just by being contrarian enough always to choose views that 
look likely to be in the minority, people would be deprived of access to equal
influence. There will be no problem if individuals who are ex ante as likely 
to choose one as another side on given issues happen in general to choose the 
losing side or aim in general to choose the losing side. The problem is confined
to the case where there is ex ante reason, associated with their independently
241
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IV. BECAUSE OF THE PLAINTIFFS’ COMPARATIVE POLITICAL POWER,
THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD REVIEW LEGISLATION 
CHALLENGED UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT  
MORE ACTIVELY THAN LEGISLATION CHALLENGED 
 UNDER THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 
Playing its proper role and preventing tyranny of the majority means 
that the Court should work to ameliorate power imbalances.119 Again, this
is not a novel idea.120 And it is one the Court itself purportedly recognizes.121 
Yet despite recognition that the Court should work to ameliorate power 
imbalances, its current approach—actively reviewing legislation challenged
under the dormant Commerce Clause and passively reviewing legislation 
challenged under the Fourteenth Amendment—exacerbates power imbalances.
One key difference between dormant Commerce Clause and Fourteenth 
Amendment plaintiffs is how much political power they have—how likely
they are to be able to get Congress to intervene on their behalf. In dormant 
Commerce Clause cases, plaintiffs seek to vindicate the interests of a state.122 
fixed identity, to think that certain individuals will be in the minority on given 
issues: their identity pre-commits them, as we might say, on those issues. 
Id. at 212–13 (footnote omitted).  To address this problem, Pettit proposes introducing “a 
system of individualized contestation that parallels the collective challenge that elections
make possible.”  Id. at 213.  This system includes recourse to courts.  Id. at 216. 
119. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 116, at 1268–69 (“That may be why, in the end, Carolene 
Products is not obsolete.  Despite all its weaknesses, and there are many, it still gives us a
way of thinking about what the courts should do. They should protect political dissenters; 
they should make sure the democratic process is not blocked; they should protect minorities 
whose condition resembles that of the clearest example of a discrete and insular minority,
African Americans in the Jim Crow South.  We might disagree about what those groups 
are; people undoubtedly do disagree about whether gays and lesbians are such a group.
But Carolene Products tells us what questions to ask. Carolene Products is certainly in 
eclipse now, but its essential vision is still powerful: the role of the courts is to make sure
that the democratic process remains open and inclusive, and that unfairly excluded minority
groups are protected. If you have a better idea about what courts should be doing in difficult
constitutional cases, let me know.”). 
120. See id.; see also Stephanopoulos, supra note 117, at 1536. 
121. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28. 
122. For example, the plaintiff in Hunt was a “a state agency, the Washington State 
Apple Advertising Commission, charged with the statutory duty of promoting and protecting
the State’s apple industry.” 432 U.S. 333, 336–37 (1977). The agency sued to challenge 
a North Carolina statute. Id. at 336. In City of Philadelphia, the plaintiffs were “several 
cities in other States,” as well as “the operators of private landfills in New Jersey,” and they
sued to challenge a New Jersey statute. 437 U.S. 617, 619 (1978). The plaintiffs in dormant 
Commerce Clause cases are not always states, state agencies, or cities. But even in these
cases, states’ interests are represented.  Indeed, often the challenges could have been brought
by states, even if other entities brought them instead.  For example, the plaintiff in Kassel
was a trucking company. See 450 U.S. 662, 664 (1981). But one of the problems the Court 
found with the Iowa law was that it intentionally kept trucks traveling interstate routes off 
Iowa highways, and consequently burdened other states with increased truck traffic. See
242
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Although defining political power can be difficult,123 on any definition of
political power, states are politically powerful actors. If any interest group 
has the ability to get Congress’ attention, states do.124 States’ interests are
represented in both houses of Congress, and each state has equal representation 
in the Senate regardless of population.125 Although it probably is true that,
as the Court has said, Congress would not act on every such dispute,126 
Congress is empowered to police interstate commerce, and there is reason
to think states would be more successful than most other interest groups
at getting Congress to address their commercial concerns.127 
There is also reason to think many Fourteenth Amendment plaintiffs 
would be less successful than other actors—certainly less successful than 
states—at getting Congress to address their concerns. In the Fourteenth
Amendment cases at issue here,128 individuals or groups who have already
lost out in their states’ political processes seek to vindicate their interests,
alleging harm from legislation passed by their own states’ legislatures.129 
id. at 677. The states that experienced increased truck traffic could have challenged the
Iowa law, and the trucking-company-plaintiff’s victory benefited these states. Bibb is similar
to Kassel in this regard and serves as another example. See 359 U.S. 520, 521–23 (1959). 
123. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 117, at 1537 (“One might think that courts and
scholars would have settled on the meaning of powerlessness in the decades since Carolene
and Rodriguez.  But one would be wrong.”). 
124. Under this analysis, subnational divisions of the United States that are not represented 
in Congress—such as territories, the District of Columbia, and Indian reservations—may
require different treatment than states.  Although I will not address this issue in detail in this
Article, I note that focusing on political power requires considering relevant distinctions between
states and other subnational divisions of the government. 
125. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1–3. 
126. See City of Phila., 437 U.S. at 623. 
127. The concerns raised in Hunt, for example, deal with interstate shipment of goods, 
which is precisely the kind of concern that the Commerce Clause empowers Congress to
regulate. See 432 U.S. at 336; see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 553 (1995) 
(explaining that commerce is traffic and intercourse, and that even earlier, and narrower, 
understandings of the Commerce Clause power permit regulation of interstate trafficking 
of goods). 
128. That is, Substantive Due Process cases that do not implicate fundamental rights 
and Equal Protection cases where the law being challenged does not facially discriminate. 
129. For example, the plaintiffs in Washington v. Davis were African American job 
applicants who were denied employment, allegedly on the basis of race. 426 U.S. 229, 
232 (1976). Similarly, the plaintiff in Feeney was a female employee who was denied a
promotion, allegedly on the basis of gender. 442 U.S. 256, 259 (1979).  The plaintiff
in Williamson was an optician challenging a law that allegedly benefitted the professional 
interest of ophthalmologists and optometrists over opticians. 348 U.S. 483, 484–85 (1955).
The plaintiff in Ferguson was an individual challenging a law that made “debt adjusting”
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Substantive Due Process plaintiffs may claim another interest group was 
able to unduly influence their state legislature.130 Equal Protection plaintiffs
may claim laws harming them passed because they are members of a group
that is marginalized in their state’s political process because of “their
independently fixed identity.”131 
Certainly not every Fourteenth Amendment case will involve such claims, 
and, even in those that do, plaintiffs’ claims may not always be true—not 
every Substantive Due Process case is brought by a plaintiff correctly claiming 
another group unduly influenced the legislature, and not every Equal Protection 
case is brought by a member of a group that has been unreasonably excluded 
from the political process. But the key point is that in some cases these
allegations will be true. And when these allegations are true, courts may
be the only recourse for groups with little political power.132  The same
political exclusion that occurred at the state level may occur at the federal
level, and, even if it does not, Congress may hesitate to interfere with state 
laws addressing intrastate issues.133 
Of course, after engaging in active review, the Court can always uphold
the challenged law.  Just as the Court’s current active approach to the dormant 
Commerce Clause does not mean it has to strike down every law challenged 
under the dormant Commerce Clause, active review in the Fourteenth 
Amendment cases discussed here would in no way necessitate striking
down every law challenged under the Fourteenth Amendment.134 But only
by actively reviewing legislation challenged under the Fourteenth Amendment
can the Court determine whether a political breakdown has occurred, and 
intervene if it has. 
Therefore, the Court should be more active in Fourteenth Amendment 
cases because the plaintiffs generally have less political power and more 
illegal except as incident to the practice of law, allegedly benefitting lawyers’ professional 
interests over other groups’ professional interests.  372 U.S. 726, 726–27 (1963). 
130. See, e.g., Ferguson, 372 U.S. at 726–27. 
131. PETTIT, supra note 118, at 213; see also, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 232.
132. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 115, at 10. 
133. Under some readings of the Commerce Clause, it is actually precluded from
doing so. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(articulating a narrow view of Congress’s Commerce Clause power that would prevent
Congress from getting involved in many of the issues raised in Substantive Due Process or 
Equal Protection cases).
134. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 147 (1986) (upholding a state law prohibiting
importing of baitfish). It is true that when the Court applies strict scrutiny in Substantive 
Due Process cases, it virtually always invalidates the law under review. See Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring) (describing conventional
strict scrutiny analysis as “scrutiny that is strict in theory, but fatal in fact”). But, even if 
Maine v. Taylor is a rare case of the Court upholding a law that it carefully scrutinized, it 
shows that active review in no way requires the Court to invalidate a law. See generally 
447 U.S. 131. 
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passive in dormant Commerce Clause cases because the plaintiffs have
more political power.  Reserving more active judicial review for Fourteenth 
Amendment cases where plaintiffs may have been unreasonably excluded
from the political process is the best approach to judicial review in a
democracy.135 In cases where both parties have enough political power to 
demand accountability from state or federal legislatures, the Court should
let democracy do its work and passively review laws.136 This approach— 
which, again, the Court at least theoretically recognizes137—gives democratically 
elected legislatures as much leeway as possible while still protecting the 
rights of groups that cannot count on the democratic process to treat them 
fairly.138 
V. CONCLUSION
This Article points out that the Supreme Court takes different approaches
to judicial review when examining legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment 
and the dormant Commerce Clause. The Court takes a passive approach 
in Fourteenth Amendment cases, deferring substantially to legislatures,
and an active approach in dormant Commerce clause cases, deferring very
little to legislatures. This Article also argues that, because of the relative 
political power of typical plaintiffs, the Court should take the opposite 
135. As Erwin Chemerinsky articulates: 
The primary reason for having a Supreme Court, then, is to enforce the Constitution 
against the will of the majority.  In a democracy, the majority can protect itself 
through the political process; it is minorities—political, racial, social, economic— 
that need protection that democracy often cannot and will not provide. 
. . . I believe that the two preeminent purposes of the Court are to protect the
rights of minorities who cannot rely on the political process and to uphold the 
Constitution in the face of any repressive desires of political majorities.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 115, at 9–10. 
136. See PETTIT, supra note 118, at 212–13.  One point about Pettit’s argument deserves
special mention. Pettit’s argument suggests the Equal Protection cases discussed in this
Article are more in need of active judicial review than the Due Process cases discussed in 
this Article because the Due Process cases deal with discrimination against certain professional 
groups and the like, not discrimination against people because of their identities. See, e.g.,
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 486–88 (1955).  I agree. While this
Article certainly argues there is an appropriate role for active judicial scrutiny of laws that
may discriminate against certain professional groups because of the greater political influence
of other professional groups, political favoritism or interest group capture on the part 
of professional groups is a lesser concern than discrimination against individuals who
are marginalized in the political process because of their identity. 
137. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). 
138. See, e.g., PETTIT, supra note 118, at 209–13. 
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approach. The Court should review legislation challenged under the dormant 
Commerce Clause less aggressively because the plaintiffs in those cases
can better rely on Congress to protect their interests. The Court should review 
legislation challenged under the Fourteenth Amendment more aggressively 
because of the risk that the plaintiffs have been unreasonably excluded from
the political process. By engaging in more active review in cases brought
by litigants who can rely on the political process to consider their interests 
and more passive review in cases brought by litigants who all too frequently
lack the power to hold legislatures accountable to their interests, the Court’s
current approach threatens to reinforce power imbalances and weaken
democracy. 
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